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This study investigates how the effects of low-wage employment and non-employment on
wage prospects vary depending on qualiﬁcation. We apply dynamic multinomial logit mod-
els with random effects and include interactions of the lagged labor market state with
qualiﬁcation to estimate heterogeneity in state dependence. We ﬁnd that low-wage jobs
are stepping stones to high-paid jobs for low qualiﬁed workers. In contrast, the chances
of workers with a university degree to obtain a high-paid job are the same when being
low-paid or non-employed (whereas their risk of non-employment is lower when having
a low-paid job). Furthermore, our results suggest that for workers with university degree
low-wage jobs are associated with negative signals.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier untersucht, inwiefern sich Effekte von Niedriglohnbeschäftigung und Nicht-
beschäftigung auf zukünftige Lohnaussichten hinsichtlich der Qualiﬁkation von Individuen
unterscheiden. Es verwendet dynamische multinomiale Logit Modelle mit zufälligen Effek-
ten und berücksichtigt Interaktionsterme der vorhergehenden Erwerbszustände mit Quali-
ﬁkation, um Heterogenität von Pfadabhängigkeit zu messen. Den Ergebnissen nach sind
Niedriglohnbeschäftigungen für Geringqualiﬁzierte Sprungbretter in Hochlohnbeschäftigun-
gen. Im Gegensatz hierzu sind die Chancen von Arbeitnehmern mit Universitätsabschluss,
eine Hochlohnbeschäftigung zu ﬁnden, gleich gross wenn sie niedriglohnbeschäftigt bzw.
nicht beschäftigt sind (wobei das Risiko, in Zukunft nicht beschäftigt zu sein, bei Niedrig-
lohnbeschäftigungen geringer ist). Außerdem deuten die Ergebnisse dieses Papiers dar-
auf hin, dass Niedriglohnbeschäftigungen mit negativen Signaleffekten für Arbeitnehmer
mit Universitätsabschluss einhergehen.
JEL classiﬁcation: J30, J60, C33
Keywords: low-pay dynamics, state dependence, dynamic multinomial logit model,
partial effect, nonlinear models, interaction term, unobserved heterogeneity
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Recent studies have investigated state dependence in non-employment and low-wage em-
ployment in order to assess whether taking up a low-paid interim job improves the labor
market prospects of not employed individuals (Buddelmeyer/Lee/Wooden, 2009; Cappel-
lari/Jenkins, 2008; Mosthaf/Schank/Schnabel, 2009; Stewart, 2007; Uhlendorff, 2006).1 So
far, the heterogeneity in these effects has been given scant attention although it is important
to know if taking up a low-paid interim job is advisable for everyone or only for speciﬁc sub-
groups of the population. This paper investigates how the effects of low-wage employment
and non-employment on future labor market outcomes vary depending on qualiﬁcation.
The current economic crisis in several OECD-countries lends a special interest to the ques-
tion whether it is beneﬁcial to take up a low-paid interim job. Ljungqvist/Sargent (1998) ar-
gue that European labor markets are more vulnerable to recessions than the US because
generous unemployment beneﬁts reduce incentives for laid-off workers to quickly accept
jobs with lower wages than those of their previous jobs. In times of economic crisis the
number of “good jobs” with high wages is limited and high reservation wages of laid-off
workers lead to long-term unemployment, a factor producing a signiﬁcant loss of human
capital. By taking up a low-paid job instead of waiting for a “good job”, unemployed individu-
als could shorten unemployment duration and thereby averting scarring effects associated
with unemployment. On the other hand Burdett (1979) and Marimon/Zilibotti (1999) point
out that searching for the right job match during unemployment may have positive returns.
Since the German government reduced the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt sys-
tem (Caliendo, 2009), there has been a lively political discussion about policy instruments
such as unemployment beneﬁts, minimum wages and employment subsidies. Given the
growing low-wage sector there is the concern that individuals accepting “bad jobs” might
become trapped in low-wage employment and in doing so might further increase their un-
employment risk (so that that there is a low-pay-no-pay cycle).
There is convincing evidence for the existence of state dependence in both non-employment
and low-wage employment. That is, the incidence of non-employment and low-wage em-
ployment leads to a higher probability to be not employed or low-paid in the future. Simi-
larly, taking up a low-paid job increases the future risk of non-employment and low-wage
employment. State dependence in no-pay and low-pay may stem from low human cap-
ital accumulation, transaction costs, changes in preferences and from signalling effects.
While there are some studies which examine the distinct sources of state dependence in
non-employment, we are not aware of studies which show the importance of the different
origins of state dependence in low-wage work.
This study uses a rich German administrative dataset and applies dynamic multinomial logit
models with random effects which control for the problem of initial conditions and include
interaction terms of the lagged labor market state. Thereby, we measure heterogeneity in
1 McCormick (1990: p. 300) focusses in his study on interim jobs and deﬁnes them as jobs which are
“acceptable by certain workers as an interim position while searching on-the-job for a preferred, but costly
to locate, job type.”
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tion. We ﬁnd that low-wage jobs clearly incur weaker scarring effects than non-employment
for low qualiﬁed workers. For high qualiﬁed workers, however, low-wage employment re-
duces the chances to get a high-paid job in the future as much as non-employment. Fur-
thermore, we show that low-wage jobs are associated with negative signals for high quali-
ﬁed workers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the literature
and of the theoretical background. Section 3 introduces the empirical speciﬁcation while
section 4 describes the institutional background and the data. Section 5 shows descriptive
statistics. The econometric results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
2 Literature and theoretical background
As mentioned above, non-employment may lead to a loss of human capital (Phelps, 1972)
or to negative signalling effects (Lockwood, 1991) and therefore enhance the probability of
facing unemployment or low-wage employment in the future. In addition, transaction costs
(like costs of job search) reduce the likelihood that workers will take up a new job (Bur-
dett, 1978; Hyslop, 1999). The incidence of non-employment may also alter preferences.
Individuals who experience an episode of non-employment in presence may ascribe a
higher utility to leisure and a lower utility to wages and consumption than in the past.
As a consequence, individuals could reduce labor supply and raise reservation wages
(Hotz/Kydland/Sedlacek, 1988). As stated for instance by Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991),
negative signalling effects may also be important for episodes of low-wage employment. It
is a reasonable assumption that this is also true for low human capital accumulation and
costs of job search.2
Thus, it appears that labor market history affects current labor market success, a phe-
nomenon referred to as state dependence in the literature. Due to the effect of time-
constant unobserved variables on labor market outcomes and by virtue of the fact that
the individuals labor market history is often not observed from its beginning, difﬁculties in
measuring state dependence arise from the separation of genuine state dependence from
spurious state dependence as well as from the problem of initial conditions. These issues
have been addressed in a number of papers (see e. g. Heckman (1981a); Heckman
(1981b); Honoré/Kyriazidou (2000); Wooldridge (2005)).
To our knowledge, genuine state dependence in low-wage work and non-employment only
has been analyzed jointly before in studies for the UK, Australia and Germany. Cap-
pellari/Jenkins (2008) investigate yearly transitions between low-wage employment, high-
wage employment and unemployment in the UK. The study ﬁnds strong evidence for a
low-pay-no-pay cycle. That is, being low-paid instead of being high-paid in period t   1 in-
creases the probability to be unemployed in period t and vice versa. Stewart (2007) comes
2 The existence of low human capital accumulation in low-wage employment is consistent with theories of
labor market segmentation (Taubman/Wachter, 1986).
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on the probability to be employed in the future as an episode of unemployment. Stewart
reasons that low-wage jobs are a conduit to repeat unemployment in the UK.
In a study for Australia, Buddelmeyer/Lee/Wooden (2009) ﬁnd considerable differences
in the effects between men and women. For men they show that the negative effect of
a low-paid job on the employment probability is rather small. Low-wage work only leads
to a higher unemployment risk when the preceding spell is an episode of unemployment.
Women having a low-paid job, however, have a much larger probability of experiencing
unemployment in future than women having a high-paid job.
Uhlendorff (2006) shows for German men that low-wage jobs reduce the probability to
get a high-wage job and increase the risk of non-employment in the future but that em-
ployment prospects of low-wage earners are still better than the prospects of not em-
ployed individuals. He concludes that low-wage jobs are stepping stones to better jobs.
Mosthaf/Schank/Schnabel (2009) investigate labor market dynamics of western German
women and come to the result that future labor market success is better for low-paid women
than for unemployed and inactive women, especially when having full-time jobs.
How does state dependence vary with qualiﬁcation? Studies estimating the determinants
of mobility out of low-wage employment rather than state dependence point to a positive im-
pact of qualiﬁcation on the probability to get high-paid. Schank/Schnabel/Stephani (2009),
Mosthaf/Schnabel/Stephani (2011), and Grün/Mahringer/Rhein (2011) show with German
administrative datasets which stem from the same sources as our dataset that transitions
from low-pay to high-pay are more likely for well qualiﬁed individuals. Cappellari (2007)
investigates low-pay dynamics of Italian workers and ﬁnds a positive but insigniﬁcant effect
of qualiﬁcation on upward mobility.3 Pavlopoulus/Fourarge (2010) use the British BHPS
and the German SOEP and come to the result that in Germany qualiﬁcation has positive
effects on the probability to get high-paid while in Great Britain qualiﬁcation has positive
effects only for those with unfavorable unobserved characteristics.
Studies which examine the determinants of transitions from non-employment to employ-
ment usually ﬁnd a positive impact of qualiﬁcation on future employment prospects: Fitzen-
berger/Wilke (2010) use the German IABS and reveal that individuals with vocational
training or university degree have shorter durations of non-employment and higher post-
unemployment earnings than low-qualiﬁed individuals. Korkeamäki/Kyyrä (2008) focus on
workers who were displaced during mass layoffs and plant closures. By analyzing a Finnish
administrative dataset, they ﬁnd that earnings losses after displacement are largest for
those with lower wages in the jobs before non-employment (who on average have lower
qualiﬁcations). These ﬁndings support the hypothesis that state dependence in low-wage
employment and non-employment is lower for high qualiﬁed individuals because they have
a higher job offer arrival rate and therefore lower costs of job search.
3 Another result of Cappellari (2007) is that high qualiﬁcation has a negative impact on the risk to enter low-
wage employment. He additionally simulates the degree of state dependence and ﬁnds that the experience
of an episode of low-pay enhances the probability to be low-paid again in the future.
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penalty of entering low-wage employment or non-employment concerning future employ-
ment prospects may be stronger for individuals with good qualiﬁcations than for low quali-
ﬁed workers. There are two reasons why state dependence could be higher for individuals
with better qualiﬁcations. First, low human capital accumulation may matter more for well
qualiﬁed workers as technological change is more important in occupations which are as-
sociated with complex tasks.
The second argument stems from theories on signalling effects. McCormick (1990) intro-
duces the idea that taking up an interim job is associated with negative signalling effects,
as employers may interpret the job search behavior of workers as a signal for their future
productivity. In his model high-productive individuals are able to move faster from job to job
and it is only proﬁtable for low-productive individuals to take up an interim job and hence
taking up such a job incurs negative signals. Workers anticipate the behavior of employers
and are reluctant to take up interim jobs.
Cunningham/Vilasuso (1999) provide another argument why high productive workers will
not be matched with low qualiﬁed jobs. Here, employers anticipate that high skilled workers
who accept low skilled jobs will search on-the-job for better matches. As a consequence,
expected tenure is short and ﬁxed hiring costs exceed the returns of hiring.
McCormick (1990) and Cunningham/Vilasuso (1999) reveal that good workers will not
be matched with bad jobs, i. e. that there is positive assortative matching. The grow-
ing empirical literature concerning this issue (which builds on Abowd/Kramarz/Margolis
(1999)) faces methodological problems associated with ﬁxed effects wage regressions (An-
drews/Gill/Schank/Upward, 2008) and is still inconclusive. However, studies investigating
ﬁrm productivity and the skill composition of the ﬁrms workforce point to the existence
of positive assortative matching (Mendes/van den Berg/Lindeboom, 2010). Besides, von
Wachter/Bender (2006) examine wage losses after job mobility of young workers and ﬁnd
some evidence for positive assortative matching with German administrative data.
We hypothesize, that negative signals of low-paid jobs are stronger for individuals with
good certiﬁcates of qualiﬁcation. While accepting low-paid interim jobs may be typical for
low qualiﬁed workers, employers might assume that high qualiﬁed workers accepting bad
jobs are an adverse selection with respect to unobserved productivity and will not hire these
workers for good jobs.
Evidence for negative signalling effects of non-employment is found for instance by Gib-
bons/Katz (1991), Oberholzer-Gee (2008), Omori (1997) and Biewen/Steffes (2010). We
are not aware, however, of evidence for the importance of signals for low-wage work. This
study adds to the literature by showing that the incidence of low-wage employment pro-
vides negative signals for high qualiﬁed workers. Moreover, we ﬁnd that low-wage jobs
clearly incur weaker scarring effects than non-employment for individuals with low quali-
ﬁcations. Yet, for high qualiﬁed workers state dependence in low-wage employment with
respect to the transition probability to high-wage employment has about the same size like
state dependence of non-employment.
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We are interested in a model for the propensity of individual i to be in state j (high-wage
employment, low-wage employment, non-employment, and an absorbing state explained
below) in time period t = s;:::;T (2001-2006). We therefore specify the following condi-




where i = 1;:::;N; j = 1;:::;4. yit 1 is a vector of dummy variables representing the
lagged employment state. qi is time-constant and indicates the individuals qualiﬁcation
level. xit is a vector of observed explanatory variables and ij are person speciﬁc random
effects. The exclusion of qi, xit or ij in this model would lead to the measurement of
spurious state dependence. We include them, so that the coefﬁcients belonging to yit 1
measure genuine state dependence.
We explicitly take into account transitions into the absorbing state to account for the pos-
sible endogeneity of panel retention. In our sample we cannot identify whether individuals
who after leaving employment do not register as unemployed or do not return to employ-
ment covered by social security are actually searching for a job, inactive or working as
civil servants or as self-employed. Van den Berg/Lindeboom/Ridder (1994) and Van den
Berg/Lindeboom (1998) show that ignoring transitions to panel retention may lead to incon-
sistent estimates if these transitions are driven by the same unobserved characteristics as
the transitions of interest.4
The estimation of dynamic models with lagged dependent variables goes along with the
initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981a). Typically, the initial state is not random, but
determined by the individuals prior labor market history and his observed and unobserved
characteristics.
f(yis 1jyi1 :::yis 2;qi;xi1 :::xis 1;ij) (2)
The latter violates the standard assumption of random effects models, namely the assump-
tion that there is no correlation between the random effects (i) and the observed variables
on the right side of the equation (yit 1, qi, xi). Wooldridge (2005) proposes to account for
possible correlation of i with yis 1, qi and xi by explicitly modeling the following distribu-
tion:
f(ijjyis 1;qi; xi;ij); (3)
where  xi are individual speciﬁc means of x over time. ij are random effects which are
orthogonal to other explanatory variables of the model.
Equation 2 shows the dependence of the initial period from the individuals pre-sample
4 Van den Berg/Lindeboom/Ridder (1994) and Van den Berg/Lindeboom (1998) apply multivariate duration
models with random effects but their point also holds for dynamic multinomial logit models.
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of variables representing the individuals prior labor market history.5 By including hi we
intend to control more precisely for the impact of the prior labor market history than it would
be done by the Wooldridge-approach in equation 3. In our model we take into account
that workers could have a higher probability to be in the state of low-wage employment or
non-employment because of the occurrence of events of low-wage employment or non-
employment in the period between 1995 and 2000 (Heckman/Borjas, 1980). In addition,
workers who are in one of both states in our analyzed period could be an adverse selection
with respect to time-invariant variables not observed in the data. In this case hi could catch
up these unobserved characteristics.6
In this study we want to measure how state dependence varies with respect to qualiﬁcation.
For this purpose, we include interaction terms of yit 1 and qi. As suggested by Wooldridge




f(yitjyit 1;yit 1  qi;qi;xit;yis 1;hi; xi;yis 1  qi;ij) (4)
We assume that the function in 4 has a Type I extreme value distribution and obtain a multi-
nomial logit model with random effects for the probability to be high-wage employed, low-
wage employed, not employed or in the absorbing state. High-wage employment serves as
reference category. Concerning the random effects we have to make assumptions about
their distribution. Therefore, we compare models with the assumption of normal distributed
random effects and models assuming a discrete distribution with an a priori unknown num-
ber of mass points. For the model of the normal random effects speciﬁcation we estimate















k + yit 1  qik + qik + zitk + ik)
dijt
f()d(); (5)
where xit;yis 1;hi; xi and yis 1  qi are summarized to zit. dijt is one if individual i is
in state j at period t and zero otherwise. For the model with the discrete distribution of
the random effects, we begin with estimating a model with one mass point and raise the
number of mass points until the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) does not improve. This
model is referred to as nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (Heckman/Singer,
1984).7
5 hi is a vector of variables representing the number of spells of non-employment and low-wage employment
in the period between 1995 and 2000 broken down by the duration of these episodes. Additionally, it
contains the cumulated duration of episodes of non-employment and episodes of low-wage employment in
the period between 1998 and 2000. See Table 2 for an overview of these variables.
6 An alternative way of including the effect of the labor market history in the period between 1995 and 2000
would be to run our estimations for all the periods between 1995 and 2006. However, our deﬁnition of
non-employment relies on information about job-search and participation in active labor market programs
which is only available since 1999 (see chapter 4 for details of the deﬁnitions of non-employment).
7 All models in this paper are estimated using the Stata-ado-ﬁle GLLAMM by Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal (2005).














k + yit 1  qik + qik + zitk + vmk)
dijt
(6)
pm is the probability of the mass point vm. Both are parameters to be estimated.
The main variable of interest in our paper is the interaction term of the lagged employment
state with qualiﬁcation yit 1  qi which measures the heterogeneity in state dependence
with respect to qualiﬁcation. The coefﬁcients in multinomial logit models cannot be inter-
preted with respect to economic signiﬁcance. Ai/Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) point
out that the calculation of partial effects of interaction terms in nonlinear models is not as
straightforward as in linear models. In our context, the partial effect of yit 1  qi of the





lj + lej + ej + zitj + ij)   f(ej + zitj + ij)]  
[f(
lj + zitj + ij)   f(zitj + ij)]; (7)
with l = 2;3 and e = 2;3;4. For identiﬁcation 
1, l1 and 1 are set to zero.9
However, this partial effect is not interesting if one wants to draw conclusions about genuine
state dependence. The cross difference in 7 consists of subtrahends with and without the
coefﬁcient of qualiﬁcation . As described earlier,  represents spurious state dependence
and hence the partial effect of the interaction term mixes up genuine state dependence
and spurious state dependence. To determine genuine state dependence  should be ﬁx.
Rather than calculating the partial effect of the interaction term, we calculate transition
matrices separated for each group of qualiﬁcation to draw conclusions about heterogeneity
in genuine state dependence. Therefore, we calculate individual predictions of yijt for each
individual i at period t conditional on the lagged labor market state and qualiﬁcation:
Pi(yijt = 1jyilt 1 = 1;qe = 1) =
f(
lj + lej + ej + xitj + yis 1'j + hi!j +  xi"j + yis 1  qij + ij) (8)
Other explanatory variables than the lagged labor market state and qualiﬁcation are ﬁxed
at the true sample values. After obtaining predictions and conﬁdence intervals for each
individual i in period t, average transition probabilities of the sample are calculated. State
dependence in low-wage employment with respect to the probability to be high-paid for a
8 For simplicity we ignore yis 1 and yis 1  qi from equation 4 when derivating the function. Our point,
however, also applies when we consider these terms in the derivation.
9 
1j is the effect of high-pay, t   1 on the probability to be in state j. 
2j the effect of low-pay, t   1 and

3j the effect of non-employment, t   1. Individuals who entered the absorbing state (j = 4) leave the
dataset. 1j represents the effect of low qualiﬁcation, 2j of lower middle qualiﬁcation, 3j the effect of
middle qualiﬁcation and 4j the effect of high qualiﬁcation.










Pi(yi1t = 1jyi1t 1 = 1;qi4 = 1) (9)
State dependence is equivalent to the partial effect of yit 1. Due to the nonlinear func-
tional form of multinomial logit models, state dependence varies by individual and moreover
varies systematically with predicted probability.10 Since our paper is focussed on the ques-
tion whether low-wage jobs can be stepping stones out of non-employment, we estimate
transition matrices for the group of workers who were not employed in period s   1.
4 Institutional background and data
The German educational system differs from those of Anglo-Saxon and most European
countries. Therefore, we brieﬂy give an overview of the German educational system be-
fore describing our sample. At the age of ten pupils leave the elementary school and
are allocated into three school tracks: basic school, middle school and advanced school.
While the basi9c school and the middle school qualify pupils for vocational training, the
advanced school is meant to educate pupils for studies in universities and provides the
school leaving certiﬁcate which enables absolvents to enter university (Abitur). Apart
from theory-orientated universities, there are polytechnical universities (technical colleges),
which rather prepare students for practice. See Riphahn/Schieferdecker (2010) for fur-
ther details. Besides universities, Germany has an apprenticeship system where appren-
tices obtain on-the-job training in establishments and formal education by the state (von
Wachter/Bender, 2006). For simplicity, we will use in the following the terminology pre-
sented in Table 1.
We use data from the German Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS). The
administrative dataset includes information on employment, unemployment beneﬁts, job
search, and participation in active labor market programs on a daily basis. It is available at
the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) (see Jacobebbinghaus/Seth (2007)).
We restrict our analysis to western Germany, because labor market conditions still vary
considerably between western and eastern Germany. As women are much more of-
ten inactive on the labor market than men, one should apply different deﬁnitions of non-
employment for both sexes. Unfortunately, we do not directly observe the search intensity
in our dataset. This is why we exclude women from our analysis.
For our study, we build a panel dataset with yearly observations at the reference day
June 30 for the period between 2000 and 2006. We analyze yearly transitions between
three mutually exclusive states: high-wage employment, low-wage employment and non-
employment. An individual is in the state of non-employment, if he is not employed in a job
liable to social security and (a) is registered as unemployed, (b) participates in a program
10 Ai/Norton (2003) illustrate the variance of partial effects of interaction terms.
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is registered as unemployed or participating in a program of active labor market policy for
at least one day in this period. Since information on employment stems from notiﬁcations
to social security bodies, we cannot rule out that individuals deﬁned as not employed are
working as civil servants or are self-employed. Earlier studies did not have access to in-
formation on job search and participation in labor market programs and used information
on unemployment beneﬁt receipt for the deﬁnition of non-employment. For the analysis
of employment dynamics of low-wage workers our deﬁnition is more appropiate since only
individuals who have been employed for at least twelve months qualify for the receipt of
unemployment beneﬁts. If we used unemployment beneﬁt receipt for the deﬁnition of non-
employment instead of job search, we would loose those low-wage workers with unstable
working careers who are of special interest in our analysis.
We follow a large part of the literature on low-wage employment and deﬁne an individual as
low-paid if he earns less than two thirds of the median gross wage of all full-time employed
individuals in western Germany liable to social security. Individuals with wages above
these thresholds are called high-paid in our analysis (as it is usually done in the literature),
although this category includes workers with wages which are lower than the average.
Although part-time jobs could be an important alternative for individuals searching for an
interim job we only consider full-time jobs here. First, working hours are only crudely
measured in our dataset and it would be impossible to assess if part-time workers are
low-paid or high-paid. Second, including part-time work would force us to deﬁne more
employment states which would require a huge computational effort.
The econometric models applied in this study are computationally very intensive. Therefore
we run our estimations on a random sample of 15 000 individuals of the IEBS who are full-
time employed or in the non-employment state in the year 2000. We deﬁne an absorbing
state for individuals leaving the panel. Individuals enter the absorbing state, when they are
working part-time at the reference day, when they cannot be classiﬁed as low-paid, high-
paid or not employed or when there is a missing value in one of the variables needed in
the econometric analysis.11 Afterwards, they are not considered anymore.
When there is a gap between two episodes of employment at the same establishment that
is equal or shorter than 32 days, we combine both job spells. Thereby, we want to reduce
problems associated with recalls. Job spells shorter than two weeks are not considered
in our analysis. This is because we want to avoid to include single payments. In our
econometric analysis we will use information of the prior labor market history between
1995 until 2000. For this period, information about job search and participation in active
labor market programs is not available. Therefore, episodes of non-employment simply are
deﬁned as gaps between two spells of part-time or full-time employment liable to social
security. We suppose that individuals who had no full-time job between 1995 and 2000
have been out of the labor force and do not consider them in our analysis. In order to omit
transitions from education to work and from work to retirement, we focus on individuals
11 Missing values are rare in our administrative dataset. One exception is the variable on education. For this
variable, we applied the IPI imputation rule by Fitzenberger/Osikominu/Völter (2006).
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during the observation period work as trainees, interns, working students, are in partial
retirement, live outside western Germany and individuals who are handicapped.
5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of our pooled sample broken down by labor
market state. 85 percent of the observations in the pooled sample are high-paid, 4 percent
are low-paid and 9 percent are in the state of non-employment. 2 percent (about 11 percent
of all individuals) enter the absorbing state in one of the years between 2001 and 2006 and
fall out of the panel.
There is a very low share of individuals with low qualiﬁcation in the high-wage sector,
whereas their share under the low-paid is high. In contrast, the share of individuals with
high qualiﬁcation is extremely small under the low-paid. Moreover, they have a relatively
low probability to be not employed. We do not observe that the probability to enter the
absorbing state follows a strong systematic pattern with respect to qualiﬁcation. Germans
are less often low-paid or not employed than foreigners and the mean local unemployment
rate is lower for high-paid individuals than for the low-paid or not employed.
We now turn to the variables describing the prior labor market history of the individuals in
our sample. Sample means of these variables indicate that individuals who have experi-
enced episodes of low-wage employment or non-employment in the past are more likely to
be in one of these employment states in the observation period. For instance, the mean
cumulated duration of episodes of non-employment between 1998 and 2000 is highest
among the non-working individuals (228 days) and lowest among the high-paid individuals.
Similarly, the mean cumulated duration of episodes of low-wage employment is highest
among the low-paid and smallest among the high-paid. What is more, individuals who en-
ter the absorbing-state on average have a higher number of episodes of non-employment
and episodes of low-wage employment between 1995 and 2000.12
The relationship between past labor market experience and current labor market outcomes
is also highlighted in Table 3. Only 13.77 percent of the individuals who were low-paid in
period t   1 in our sample got a high-paid job in the following period. 64.19 percent of
them remained low-paid. 16.81 percent lost their job, while 5.23 entered the absorbing-
state. In contrast, almost all individuals who where high-paid in t   1 also were high-paid
in t (95.46 percent). Like low-wage workers, individuals who were not working in period
t 1 were more likely to be not employed or low-paid than previously high-paid individuals.
This pattern is in line with results by Uhlendorff (2006) based on data of the GSOEP. The
probability of entering the absorbing state is largest for low-paid individuals and smallest
for the high-paid.
12 Note that some individuals enter more than one state in the pooled dataset and therefore one has to be
cautious when interpreting this table. However, the pattern described here is also valid when we only
consider the variable means calculated for the year 2006.
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wage employment typically are larger for individuals with better qualiﬁcations, although the
difference between preciously low-paid individuals with lower middle qualiﬁcation, middle
qualiﬁcation and high qualiﬁcation is only marginal. 15.57 percent of the low-paid individ-
uals with university or technical college degree obtained a high-paid job in the following
period, while only 9.05 percent of the low-wage workers with low qualiﬁcation moved up
the job ladder. The variation of upward mobility from non-employment to high-wage em-
ployment varies more dramatically. 23.50 percent of the best qualiﬁed workers reach the
high-wage sector and only 4.94 percent of the individuals with the lowest qualiﬁcation get
a high-paid job in the next year.
With respect to the average values of our descriptive transition matrix, low-paid workers
seem to be better off than those without a job. While the average transition rate to high-
wage employment is around 14 percent for both employment states, the transition rate to
non-employment is clearly lower for low-wage workers (16.81 percent) than for the non-
employed (74.59 percent). Breaking down the transition rates by qualiﬁcation we get a
more differentiated picture. For low-wage workers with low qualiﬁcation, the transition rate
to better jobs is higher, when being low-paid instead of not being employed and hence,
low-wage jobs seem to be stepping stones out of non-employment. For the best qualiﬁed,
however, the transition rate from non-employment to high-wage employment is higher than
the transition rate from low-pay to high-pay. This suggests that for individuals with university
or technical college degree, low-wage jobs are rather dead-ends regarding future wage
prospects.
The statistics presented in this chapter are descriptive and do not allow us to draw conclu-
sions about genuine state dependence in low-pay-no-pay dynamics. Therefore, we apply
the econometric model presented in chapter 3.
6 Econometric results
In our empirical analysis, we test alternative speciﬁcations of the dynamic multinomial logit
models with random effects described in section 3. Some statistics of the estimated mod-
els are presented in table 4.13 We ﬁrst discuss models without interactions of the lagged
labor market states and qualiﬁcation. Model 1 is a dynamic multinomial logit model with
normally distributed random effects which estimates the probabilities to be in one of the
four states: high-wage employment, low-wage employment, non-employment, and the ab-
sorbing state. All parameters of the variance-covariance matrix are highly signiﬁcant, that
is there are some time-constant unobserved characteristics which affect the probabilities
of all states. Ignoring one of the four states could theoretically lead to biased estimates. As
the estimation of models with multivariate random effects is computationally very intensive,
however, we also tested a model which does not consider the absorbing state. Although
panel retention is endogenous the coefﬁcients of both models are very similar. This is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Van den Berg/Lindeboom (1998) who jointly estimate labor
13 The regression tables including all coefﬁcients of the models in Table 4 are available on request.
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following, we will ignore panel retention.
Model 3 assumes a discrete distribution of the random effects with six mass points. The
coefﬁcients are similar to the ones of model 2. However, the AIC of model 2 is slightly
lower than that of model 3. We therefore rely on the model with the normal random effects
speciﬁcation in the following. In model 4, interaction terms of the lagged labor market states
with qualiﬁcation are added. This model provides the lowest AIC.
Table 5 shows the estimated coefﬁcients of model 4. High-wage employment in period
t serves as the reference category of the dependent variable. The parameters of the
variance-covariance matrix (2 and 3 and 23) are clearly signiﬁcant at the one percent
level. The positive sign of the covariance 23 shows that there are time-constant unob-
served characteristics which enhance the probability to be low-paid or not employed but
reduce the probability to be high-paid.
The coefﬁcients of the labor market states in period s   1 (year 2000) are highly signiﬁ-
cant with respect to the probabilities to be low-paid or not employed, respectively, versus
the probability of having a high-paid job. This indicates that initial conditions are endoge-
nous and controlling for the initial conditions problem is indispensable. The labor market
experience before the year 2000 is correlated with the propensity of being in one of the
three labor market states in the years between 2001 and 2006. The higher the number
of episodes of non-employment between 1995 and 2000 and the cumulated durations of
low-wage employment between 1998 and 2000, the higher is the propensity to be low-paid
or not employed in the period between 2001 and 2006. Yet, our model does not allow us
to infer whether these correlations stem from true occurrence or duration dependence or
whether these variables rather serve as proxies for unobserved heterogeneity.
The coefﬁcients representing the qualiﬁcation of the individuals in our sample indicate that
better qualiﬁcation leads to a lower probability of being low-paid in comparison with the
probability of being high-paid, This is in line with the results of studies estimating the up-
ward mobility of low-wage earners.14 It has to be noted, however, that these coefﬁcients are
likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity and hence cannot be interpreted as
causal effects.15 The coefﬁcients of lower middle and middle qualiﬁcation on the probabil-
ity to be in the state of non-employment are positive in sign but insigniﬁcant. As expected,
individuals with high qualiﬁcations have a smaller probability to be not employed than indi-
viduals with low qualiﬁcations.
We do not detect large statistical effects of age with our model. Only the coefﬁcients of the
dummy variables Age: 35-39 and Age: 55-59 are statistically different from the reference
category Age: 31-34. Though, there is a high multicolinearity with the individual speciﬁc
means over time of the age variables. While Turkish nationality does not seem to be
14 e. g. Schank/Schnabel/Stephani (2009), Mosthaf/Schnabel/Stephani (2011), Grün/Mahringer/Rhein
(2011), Pavlopoulus/Fourarge (2010).
15 The Wooldridge-method is only able to measure causal effects of time-varying variables. This is a minor
problem as the time-invariant variables representing qualiﬁcation are not central in our analysis.
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nationalities other than German or Turkish are both more often low-paid or not-employed
in our sample. Furthermore, the higher the local unemployment rate, the higher is the
probability of not being employed in comparison with the probability of being high-paid.
We now turn to the coefﬁcients of the lagged labor market states and its interactions with
qualiﬁcation. High-wage in period t   1 serves as the reference category for the variables
low-pay, t 1 and non-employment, t 1. These variables in turn serve as reference cate-
gory for the corresponding interactions with qualiﬁcation and hence have to be interpreted
with respect to individuals with low qualiﬁcation.
That is, the signiﬁcant parameter of low-pay, t 1 on the probability of being low-paid indi-
cates that the low educated who experienced an episode of low-pay in the preceding period
have a higher probability of being low-paid again rather than being high-paid in period t.
For formerly low-paid individuals with lower middle qualiﬁcation, the probability of being
low-paid is lower than for those with low qualiﬁcation. The coefﬁcient of the interaction
of the lagged labor market state with middle qualiﬁcation is not statistically different from
zero at the 10 percent level. However, individuals who experienced an episode of low-pay
in t   1 and who have a high qualiﬁcation have a higher probability of being repeatedly
low-paid rather than high-paid than those with low qualiﬁcation.
Non-employment in t   1 also leads to a higher probability of low-pay in period t in com-
parison with the probability of high-pay in period t. This effect, however, is strongest for
individuals with low qualiﬁcation. All interaction terms of non-employment, t   1 are neg-
ative in sign, although the coefﬁcient of non-employment,t   1high qualiﬁcation is not
statistically different from zero.
With respect to the probability of non-employment in t the coefﬁcients of the lagged en-
dogenous variables without interactions show, that both the experience of low-wage em-
ployment and non-employment lead to a higher probability to be not employed in presence.
While not statistically different from zero in every case, the results indicate that low qualiﬁed
individuals have the lowest probability of being high-paid as compared to not being em-
ployed. This pattern is most pronounced regarding the transitions out of non-employment.
To sum up, both the experience of low-wage employment and non-employment in the past
enhances the probability of being low-paid or not-paid in presence. While state depen-
dence in non-employment is highest for individuals with low qualiﬁcation the same is only
true for low-wage employment regarding the probability of not being employed in compar-
ison with the probability of being high-paid. Regarding the probability of being low-paid
rather than high-paid, workers with lower middle qualiﬁcation and (although the effect is
not statistically different from zero) workers with middle qualiﬁcation have a lower probabil-
ity of being low-paid again than those with low qualiﬁcation. Formerly low-paid workers with
high qualiﬁcation face higher state dependence than those with low qualiﬁcation and es-
pecially than those with lower middle qualiﬁcation. In section 2, we discussed the different
sources of state dependence in low-wage employment. In the following we will argue that
the described pattern points to the importance of negative signalling effects for low-wage
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In section 2, we argue that low human capital accumulation and negative signalling effects
may explain higher state dependence in low-wage employment and non-employment for
high qualiﬁed individuals. As high qualiﬁed workers only face stronger state dependence in
low-wage employment and scarring effects of non-employment are highest for workers with
low qualiﬁcations, we do not believe that low human capital accumulation can explain our
results. There is no reason why low human capital accumulation should be more important
for high qualiﬁed individuals when being low-paid but not when being in the state of non-
employment. Episodes of non-employment are more common events in the labor market
history of high qualiﬁed workers than episodes of low-wage employment (see also Table
2 the argument of McCormick (1990) in section 2). Hence, it is plausible to argue that
negative signalling effects are stronger for high qualiﬁed individuals when being low-paid
but not (to that degree) when being non-employed.
As coefﬁcients of multinomial logit models are difﬁcult to interpret with respect to the size of
the effect, we calculated average transition probabilities using the parameters of model 4.
Table 6 shows average transition probabilities for those individuals who were not employed
in the year 2000 broken down by qualiﬁcation. Transition matrices calculated for other
subgroups in our sample are available on request. The conclusion by Uhlendorff (2006)
for western German men that low-wage employment goes along with a higher probability
of changing to high-wage employment and a lower probability of getting not employed than
non-employment is clearly conﬁrmed for those with low qualiﬁcations. The probability of
being high-paid is 0.137 for those who were low-paid in t   1. This estimate is not in the
5 percent conﬁdence interval of the probability of being high-paid for those who were not
employed in t 1 (0.037 and 0.092 respectively). The risk of not being employed in t is also
lower when being low-paid. The point estimates of the probability of not being employed in
t are 0.537 for those who were low-paid and 0.851 for those not employed in t   1. The
conﬁdence intervals do not overlap.
The same pattern applies for those who have a lower middle qualiﬁcation level. However,
looking at the probabilities of those with middle qualiﬁcation the picture becomes unclear.
The point estimates of the probability of being high-paid for those who were low-paid in
t   1 lies in the conﬁdence interval of the probability for those who were not employed in
the preceding period. Yet, their risk of not being employed is still lower.
We now turn to the transition probabilities of individuals with high qualiﬁcation. Those
with the best qualiﬁcation have the highest probability of being high-paid and the lowest
probability of not being employed. However, with respect to the probability of being high-
paid, the probability for those who were low-paid is almost the same in comparison with
those who were not paid in t   1. State dependence in low-wage work regarding the
probability of being high-paid is 34.7 percent points (0.637-0.290) while state dependence
for those with low qualiﬁcation is 31.5 and state dependence for those with lower middle
qualiﬁcation is 23.6. Again, concerning the risk of non-employment low-wage workers are
still better off than those not employed.
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technical college or university degree. While those with low qualiﬁcation have better la-
bor market prospects when being low-paid instead of not being employed, for individuals
with high qualiﬁcation, this is only true when one considers the risk of non-employment.
Regarding the chances to get a high-paid job, low-wage jobs go along with the same tran-
sition probabilities as non-employment.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined transitions between high-wage employment, low-wage employ-
ment and non-employment using dynamic multinomial logit models which control for unob-
served heterogeneity and the problem of initial conditions. Using a rich German adminis-
trative dataset, we focussed on heterogeneity in state dependence in both low-wage em-
ployment and non-employment with respect to qualiﬁcation by including interaction terms
of the lagged labor market states.
We showed that results of earlier studies that low-wage jobs serve as stepping stones to
better-paid jobs still hold for individuals without vocational training and for individuals with
apprenticeship and without Abitur. However, for individuals with technical college or uni-
versity degree state dependence in low-wage employment with respect to the probability of
getting a high-paid job has about the same size like state dependence in non-employment.
Looking at the risk of non-employment, low-wage workers are better off than those not
employed regardless of the qualiﬁcation level.
State dependence in low-wage employment regarding the transition to high-wage employ-
ment is strongest for those with the highest qualiﬁcation level. We conclude that low-wage
jobs indeed go along with negative signals for high qualiﬁed workers. This result is im-
portant for labor market policy. If low human capital accumulation was the most important
source of state dependence in low-wage work, high qualiﬁed low-wage workers could pre-
vent scarring effects by participating in further training measures. This, however, would not
lead to lower state dependence if signalling effects were the main origin of state depen-
dence. In this case, policy makers could weaken employment protection in order to reduce
the employers costs of screening workers.
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no vocational training low qualiﬁcation
vocational training, no Abitur lower middle qualiﬁcation
vocational training, Abitur middle qualiﬁcation
technical college or university degree high qualiﬁcation
Table 2: Variable means by labor market state
High- Low- Non- Absorbing-
pay pay employment state
Low qualiﬁcation (dummy) 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.12
Lower middle qualiﬁcation (dummy) 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.66
Middle qualiﬁcation (dummy) 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07
High qualiﬁcation (dummy) 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.16
Age: 30-34 (dummy) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10
Age: 35-39 (dummy) 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27
Age: 40-44 (dummy) 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.25
Age: 45-49 (dummy) 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20
Age: 50-54 (dummy) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
Age: 55-59 (dummy) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04
Nationality: German (dummy) 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.87
Nationality: Turkish (dummy) 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04
Nationality: other (dummy) 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.10
Local unemployment rate 8.23 8.94 9.24 7.90
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 0 / <= 180 days 0.07 0.61 0.53 0.29
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 180 / <= 365 days 0.03 0.31 0.19 0.11
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 365 / <= 545 days 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.04
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 545 / <= 730 days 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.03
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 730 0.02 0.31 0.06 0.06
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 0 / <= 180 days 0.34 0.94 0.87 0.56
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 180 / <= 365 days 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.17
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 365 / <= 545 days 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.05
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 545 / <= 730 days 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.04
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 730 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.08
Cumulated duration of low-wage employment between 1998 and 2000 18.58 304.48 82.98 71.20
Cumulated duration of non-employment between 1998 and 2000 34.44 161.56 228.05 101.95
Share of observations 0.85 0.04 0.09 0.02
Number of observations 71962 3367 7862 1666
Number of individuals 15140 2926 4539 1666
Source: IEBS (1995-2006); pooled unbalanced sample; 15 000 individuals
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High- Low- Non- Absorbing- Total
pay, t pay, t employment, t state, t
High-pay, t   1 95.46 0.67 2.24 1.63 100
Low-pay, t   1 * low qualiﬁcation 9.05 68.49 17.32 5.15 100
Low-pay, t   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation 14.77 63.58 16.87 4.78 100
Low-pay, t   1 * middle qualiﬁcation 14.86 59.43 16.57 9.14 100
Low-pay, t   1 * high qualiﬁcation 15.75 61.42 13.39 9.45 100
Low-pay, t   1 13.77 64.19 16.81 5.23 100
Non-employment, t   1 * low qualiﬁcation 4.94 8.11 83.69 3.26 100
Non-employment, t   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation 13.66 8.82 74.15 3.36 100
Non-employment, t   1 * middle qualiﬁcation 18.39 6.13 69.98 5.50 100
Non-employment, t   1 * high qualiﬁcation 23.50 3.79 66.40 6.31 100
Non-employment, t   1 13.55 8.13 74.59 3.73 100
Source: IEBS (1995-2006); pooled unbalanced sample; 15 000 individuals; Transitions between periods t - 1 and
t; ﬁgures indicate row percentages
Table 4: Model speciﬁcations
Model No. 1 2 3 4
Control for panel retention yes no no no
Distribution of random effects
a normal normal (-) discrete (6) normal (-)
Signiﬁcance of parameters of the variance-covariance matrix yes yes yes yes
Interactions no no no yes
Log likelihood -23423.373 -17013.3 -16983.6 -16960.1
Number of parameters 120 79 91 103
AIC 47086.7 34184.5 34211.5 34126.1
a Number of mass points in parantheses
Table 5: Model 4, multinomial logit model with random effects (normal distri-
bution), model without absorbing-state, with interactions
Low-pay, t Non-employment, t
b/se b/se
High-pay, t   1 (reference group) - -
Low-pay, t   1 (dummy) 3.664*** 2.483***
(0.322) (0.311)
Low-pay, t   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation -0.567* -0.904***
(0.334) (0.330)
Low-pay, t   1 * middle qualiﬁcation -0.661 -0.722
(0.541) (0.541)
Low-pay, t   1 * high qualiﬁcation 1.010* -0.286
(0.612) (0.608)
Non-employment, t   1 (dummy) 3.269*** 4.405***
(0.306) (0.244)
Non-employment, t   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation -0.798** -1.533***
(0.324) (0.252)
Non-employment, t   1 * middle qualiﬁcation -1.430*** -1.811***
(0.501) (0.334)
Non-employment, t   1 * high qualiﬁcation -0.418 -1.626***
(0.512) (0.306)
Table is continued on the next page
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Lower middle qualiﬁcation (dummy) -0.378* 0.125
(0.195) (0.145)
Middle qualiﬁcation (dummy) -0.714** 0.326
(0.310) (0.204)
High qualiﬁcation (dummy) -2.340*** -0.393**
(0.330) (0.176)
Age: 31-34 (reference group) - -
Age: 35-39 (dummy) 0.060 -0.263**
(0.154) (0.116)
Age: 40-44 (dummy) 0.065 -0.286
(0.243) (0.181)
Age: 45-49 (dummy) 0.285 -0.149
(0.332) (0.244)
Age: 50-54 (dummy) 0.462 0.168
(0.424) (0.309)
Age: 55-59 (dummy) 0.920* 0.768**
(0.524) (0.378)
Nationality: German (reference group) - -
Nationality: Turkish (dummy) 0.218 0.264
(0.231) (0.196)
Nationality: other (dummy) 0.530*** 0.441***
(0.159) (0.136)
Local unemployment rate -0.007 0.064**
(0.034) (0.026)
Individual averages (xi):
Individual average of age: 35-39 -0.591 -0.147
(0.365) (0.297)
Individual average of age: 40-44 -0.578* -0.061
(0.330) (0.259)
Individual average of age: 45-49 -0.656 0.110
(0.444) (0.341)
Individual average of age: 50-54 -0.798 -0.154
(0.521) (0.392)
Individual average of age: 55-59 -1.039 -0.523
(0.705) (0.522)
Individual average of local unemployment rate 0.047 0.002
(0.037) (0.028)
High-pay, t = s   1 (reference group) - -
Low-pay, t = s   1 (dummy) 3.693*** 3.423***
(0.442) (0.411)
Low-pay, t = s   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation 0.094 -0.267
(0.432) (0.414)
Low-pay, t = s   1 * middle qualiﬁcation 0.791 -0.518
(0.717) (0.680)
Low-pay, t = s   1 * high qualiﬁcation 0.104 -1.857**
(0.844) (0.942)
Non-employment, t = s   1 (dummy) 3.158*** 4.355***
(0.441) (0.386)
Non-employment, t = s   1 * lower middle qualiﬁcation -0.208 -0.245
(0.440) (0.378)
Non-employment, t = s   1 * middle qualiﬁcation -0.095 -0.943*
(0.690) (0.550)
Non-employment, t = s   1 * high qualiﬁcation -0.386 -0.795*
(0.642) (0.478)
Table is continued on the next page
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(0.070) (0.062)
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 180 / <= 365 days 0.018 -0.030
(0.115) (0.111)
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 365 / <= 545 days 0.160 0.211
(0.222) (0.205)
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 545 / <= 730 days 0.126 -0.368
(0.275) (0.261)
Number of low-pay episodes with tenure > 730 0.791*** 0.062
(0.244) (0.238)
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 0 / <= 180 days 0.371*** 0.385***
(0.041) (0.033)
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 180 / <= 365 days 0.419*** 0.354***
(0.106) (0.091)
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 365 / <= 545 days 0.892*** 0.921***
(0.163) (0.142)
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 545 / <= 730 days 0.859*** 0.945***
(0.216) (0.187)
Number of non-employment episodes with duration > 730 1.046*** 1.421***
(0.220) (0.182)
Cumulated duration of low-wage employment between 1998 and 2000 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Cumulated duration of non-employment between 1998 and 2000 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Variance 2 4.698 0.306***
Variance 3 4.715 0.280***






Source: IEBS (1995-2006); 15 000 individuals; year dummies included
Reference group of the dependent variable is high-pay, t   1
Coefﬁcients; Standard errors in parantheses; levels of signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10; ** p < 0:05; *** p < 0:01
Table 6: Simulated transition matrices by group of qualiﬁcation: initially non-employed
Low qualiﬁcation
High-pay, t Low-pay, t Non-employment, t
High-pay, t   1 0.452 (0.348) (0.555) 0.106 (0.061) (0.170) 0.443 (0.341) (0.545)
Low-pay, t   1 0.137 (0.084) (0.211) 0.326 (0.230) (0.435) 0.537 (0.422) (0.640)
Non-employment, t   1 0.060 (0.037) (0.092) 0.089 (0.057) (0.134) 0.851 (0.794) (0.895)
Lower middle qualiﬁcation
High-pay, t Low-pay, t Non-employment, t
High-pay, t   1 0.447 (0.344) (0.557) 0.076 (0.041) (0.127) 0.477 (0.371) (0.575)
Low-pay, t   1 0.211 (0.140) (0.300) 0.275 (0.180) (0.386) 0.514 (0.403) (0.620)
Non-employment, t   1 0.138 (0.086) (0.210) 0.095 (0.054) (0.157) 0.768 (0.675) (0.836)
Middle qualiﬁcation
High-pay, t Low-pay, t Non-employment, t
High-pay, t   1 0.430 (0.321) (0.545) 0.053 (0.024) (0.100) 0.518 (0.401) (0.627)
Low-pay, t   1 0.198 (0.108) (0.318) 0.182 (0.091) (0.327) 0.621 (0.445) (0.756)
Non-employment, t   1 0.150 (0.088) (0.234) 0.047 (0.020) (0.102) 0.803 (0.704) (0.876)
High qualiﬁcation
High-pay, t Low-pay, t Non-employment, t
High-pay, t   1 0.637 (0.535) (0.726) 0.020 (0.008) (0.048) 0.343 (0.255) (0.440)
Low-pay, t   1 0.290 (0.175) (0.431) 0.238 (0.123) (0.391) 0.472 (0.308) (0.628)
Non-employment, t   1 0.277 (0.205) (0.355) 0.050 (0.026) (0.090) 0.674 (0.589) (0.748)
Source: IEBS (1995-2006); transition matrices simulated with parameters of model 4 averaged over those indi-
viduals who were not employed in period s   1; ﬁve percent conﬁdence intervals in parentheses
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